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JUDICIAL IMMUNITY: AN UNQUALIFIED SANCTION OF
TYRANNY FROM THE BENCH?
Stump v. Sparkman, 98 S. Ct. 1099 (1978)
In a suit brought against an Indiana circuit court judge, Linda Kay Sparkman sought damages alleging that the judge deprived her of her fundamental
rights. Judge Stump had approved' a petition 2 submitted by appellant's mother
to have her then fifteen-year-old daughter sterilized. After Judge Stump signed
the sterilization petition,' Linda went to a hospital ostensibly to have her appendix removed; in fact, a tubal ligation was performed.4 Four years later,
Linda learned of the consequences of the operation.5 She then sought damages
under 42 U.S.C. §19836 alleging that the actions of defendants7 in sterilizing
her or causing her to be sterilized violated her constitutional rights. 8 The dis1. In approving the petition Judge Stump cited no statutory or common law basis for
his decision. His order read: "I, Harold D. Stump, Judge of DeKalb Circuit Court, do hereby
approve the above petition by affidavit form on behalf of Ora Spitler McFarlin, to have
Tubal Ligation performed 'upon her minor daughter, Linda Spitler, subject to said Ora
Spitler McFarlin covenanting and agreeing to indemnify and keep indemnified Dr. John
Hines and the DeKalb Memorial Hospital from any matters or causes of action arising therefrom." Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172, 174, n.1 (7th Cir. 1977).
2. In the petition captioned, "Petition to Have Tubal Ligation Performed on Minor and
Indemnity Agreement," plaintiff's mother alleged that her daughter was "somewhat retarded" although the girl was in public school and was being passed along with others her
age. 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1102, n.1 (1978). The petition also stated that Linda had been associating
with young men, that she had stayed overnight with said young men, and that plaintiff's
mother could not keep a constant watch over the girl. Id. The only reason cited in the
petition for the tubal ligation was to "prevent unfortunate circumstances." Id.
3. Judge Stump issued the requested approval of the petition in an ex parte proceeding.
No notice was given to Linda Sparkman, no hearing was held, and no guardian ad litem was
appointed to represent Linda's interests. Further, neither the petition nor the order was ever
filed in the DeKalb County Circuit Court. Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d at 173. Because
Linda was not notified nor informed of the nature of the operation that was to be performed
on her, she had no opportunity to appeal from Judge Stump's decision or to contest her
mother's allegations. Id. at 176.
4. Stump v. Sparkman, 98 S.Ct. at 1103.
5. In 1973, approximately two years after the operation, Linda Spitler married Leo
Sparkman. When she was unable to have a child, Linda first learned from her doctor that
she had been sterilized in 1971. Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d at 173.
6. 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1970) reads in part: "Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, priviliges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
7. Also named as defendants were Linda's mother, Ora Spitler McFarlin, the doctors who
performed or assisted in the operation, the hospital where it was performed, and her mother's
attorney, who had prepared the petition. The claims against these defendants were pendent
state claims for assault and battery and malpractice and were attached to the claims brought
in the federal district court against Judge Stump. 98 S. Ct. at 1103.
8. Plaintiff alleged that the defendants violated the following constitutional guarantees:
"l. that the actions were arbitrary and thus in violation of the due process clause of the
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trict court dismissed the action on the ground that Judge Stump was "clothed
with absolute judicial immunity." 9 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that because the judge had acted extrajudicially, the doctrine of
judicial immunity was inapplicable. 10 On certiorari, the United States Supreme
Court reversed and HELD, because Indiana law gave a circuit judge jurisdiction to consider and act upon a petition for sterilization, the judge was immune from damages liability even though approval of the petition may have
been erroneous.11
In 1868, the Supreme Court in Randall v. Brigham'2 first recognized the
doctrine of judicial immunity. 3 The Court held that judicial officers were not

liable in a civil action for any judicial act done within their jurisdiction. However, the Court limited the scope of the doctrine of immunity by indicating
that judges might be held liable for malicious or corrupt acts done in excess of
their jurisdiction.14
Fourteenth Amendment; 2. that Linda was denied procedural safeguards required by the
Fourteenth Amendment; 3. that the sterilization was permitted without promulgation of
standards; 4. that the sterilization was an invasion of privacy; 5. that the sterilization violated
Linda's right to procreate; 6. that the sterilization was cruel and unusual punishment; 7. that
the use of sterilization as punishment for her alleged retardation or lack of self-discipline
violated various constitutional guarantees; 8. that the defendants failed to follow certain
Indiana statutes, thus derpriving Linda of due process of law; and 9. that the defendants
violated the equal protection clause, because of the differential treatment accorded Linda on
account of her sex, marital status, and allegedly low mental capacity." 98 S. Ct. at 1103 n.2,
citing Civil No. F75-129 (N.D. Ind. May 13, 1976).
9. Finding that Judge Stump had acted within his jurisdiction, the district court held
that he was immune from suit and could not be "held liable under §1983. Id. The district
court found that the only state action within the meaning of §1983 had been the approval
of the petition by Judge Stump. Having dismissed the federal claim against the judge, the
district court then dismissed the pendent state claims against the other defendants for want
of subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
10. Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172, 173 (7th Cir. 1977). The court stated that the
general grant of jurisdiction to the circuit courts, while broad, did not cloak an Indiana
circuit judge with blanket immunity. Id. at 174. "A claim must be characterized as a case in
law or equity in order to come within the statute. In short, it must have a statutory or
common law basis." Id. Examining Indiana statutory and common law, the court found no
authority for Judge Stump's action. Id. Because-Judge Stump's action fell without the statutory grant of jurisdiciton, he was not "clothed with absolute judicial immunity." Id. at 175.
Moreover, even if Judge Stump had acted within his conimon 'law power, the Court stated
that his action was an illegitimate exercise of that authority because of his failure to comply
with principles of due process. Id. at 176.
11. 98 S. Ct. 1099 (1978).
12. 74 U.S. 523 (1868).
13. For the history of the doctrine of judicial immunity which developed out of the
English feudal system, see generally Note, Remedies Against the United States and Its
Officials, 70 HARv. L. Rgv. 827 (1957). See also.Kattan, Knocking on Wood: Some Thoughts
on the Immunities of State Officials to Civil Rights Damages Actions, 30 VANri. L. Rv.941

(1977).
14. Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. at 535-36. The Court stated: "If faithless, if corrupt, if
dishonest, if partial, if oppressive or arbitrary, ... "[judges] may be called to account by im.
peachment, and removed from office." Id. at 537. See generally Kattan, supra note 13, at
958-59.
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In the leading immunity decision of Bradley v. Fisher,'5 the Supreme Court
reexamined the Randall opinion and held that judges were not liable in civil
actions for their judicial acts, regardless of motive.' 6 Recognizing that judges
need to exercise judicial discretion within their vested authority, the Court
used the doctrine of immunity to encourage independent judicial thinking1r
The Bradley Court, reasoning that amenability of judges to suit would inhibit the exercise of discretion in controversial cases,' 8 established an absolute
immunity 9 applicable even when a judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction.
The Court further justified the immunity doctrine by recognizing that a
20
judge's errors could be corrected on appeal.
In 1967, the Supreme Court extended the judicial immunity doctrine to
actions brought under section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, now 42 U.S.C.

15. 80 U.S. 335 (1871). In Bradley, the defendant judge had ordered that plaintiff's name
be stricken from the roll of attorneys practicing in the criminal court of the District of
Columbia. Id. at 337. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had acted maliciously and
without jurisdiction. Id. The Court held that the defendant acted in excess of his jurisdiction
by not affording plaintiff an opportunity for a hearing, but that he did have the general
jurisdiction to admit or disbar attorneys to that court. Id. at 356-57. Therefore, he was not
personally liable. Id.
16. In an opinion written by Mr. Justice Field, author of the Randall opinion, the Court
held that the qualifying words "maliciously and corruptly" were not necessary to a correct
statement of the law. The Court stated: "[f-udges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction
...
[were] not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts were alleged
to have been done maliciously or corruptly." Id. at 351.
17. Id. at 347. "For it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall
be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to
himself. Liability to answer to every one who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of
the judge, would be inconsistent with the possession of this freedom, and would destroy that
independence without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful." Id. See also
Note, supra note 13, at 855: "When a judge acts in good faith and with colorable jurisdiction,
the availability of a defense to a subsequent action against him is easily rationalized as being
essential to the proper administration of justice. A decision as to liability or jurisdiction may
be influenced by considerations other than the merits of the case when made with the
knowledge that, if found to be erroneous, it may expose the judge to an action for damages."
18. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1871).
See also Kattan, supra note 13, at 958-61.
19. The term absolute immunity was used to mean that a judge's motives did not affect
the application of immunity. Kattan, supra note 13, at 958-59. Similarly, with respect to legislators, improper motive and bad faith have no effect upon the invocation of immunity. Judge,
Schirof & Bliss, Judicial Immunity Under the Civil Rights Act: Here Come the Judge's Defenses, 7 JOHN Mu. J. PRAC. & PROc. 213, 218 (1974). In contrast, the immunity granted to a
prosecuting attorney was a narrower immunity in that his motives may affect the invocation
of that immunity doctrine. Id. at 221. But cf. Rhodes v. Houston, 202 F. Supp. 624, 634 (D.
Neb. 1962) (prosecuting officials were immune from suit even though it was alleged that their
acts were done maliciously).
20. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). The Court in Pierson stated: "His errors
may be corrected on appeal, but he should not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may
hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption." Id. See also Kattan, supra note 13,
at 959.
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§1983.21 In light of an earlier holding- that Congress did not intend to abolish
other common law immunities by enacting section 1983, the Court held in
Pierson v. Ray23 that the judicial immunity doctrine had not been abrogated.
Thus ended the period between enactment of the Civil Rights Act and the
Pierson decision during which the Act could have been enforced against a
4
judge.2
While the scope of judicial immunity was expanding, it was not limitless.
The Court in Bradley, emphasizing the distinction25 between acts done in ex21. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). In Pierson, plaintiffs and others were involved in
a "prayer pilgrimage" from New Orleans to Detroit. Id. at 552. Plaintiffs were members of a
group of white and black Episcopal clergyman who attempted to use segregated facilities at
an interstate bus terminal in Jackson, Mississippi. Id. at 549. They were arrested and brought
to trial before defendant, Judge Spencer. The judge convicted plaintiffs under a Mississippi
statute which made anyone who breached the peace guilty of a misdemeanor. Id. On appeal
the case was dropped. Id. at 550. Subsequently, plaintiffs brought suit for damages in federal
district court under section 1983 for false arrest and imprisonment. Id. at 548. The Supreme
Court held that Judge Spencer was immune from liability for damages for his role in the
convictions, finding no xecord that the Judge played any role in the arrest or convictions
other than adjudging plaintiffs guilty. Id. at 553. The Court further held that the judicial
immunity protecting Judge Spencer from liability was a defense even in an action under
§1983. Id. at 554.
22. In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 567 (1951), the Court held that legislators were
immune from liability for acts done or words spoken in a legislative proceeding. However,
immunity applied only to acts done in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity. Id. at
376-77. The Court said they would not hesitate to sustain the rights of private individuals if
they found that Congress had acted outside its legislative role. Id. at 377. Legislative immunity was founded upon the speech and debate clause, U.S. CONsT. art. I §6, d. 1, which
made speech and debate in the legislative department privileged. Since legislative immunity
was a well established doctrine, the Court held that Congress had not abolished that immunity by enacting §1983. Id.
23. 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967). See generally Judge, Schirof & Bliss, supra note 19, at
218. See also Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YAx L. J. 322 (1969).
24. See, e.g., Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879), in which the Court held that a judge
of a county circuit court in Virginia could be held liable under Section 1 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871 for the violation of the constitutional rights of blacks. The judge had been indicted in a federal district court for exclusion of and failure to select blacks as grand jurors.
The Court held that the judge had acted outside of his authority and that therefore he
could be punished for his disobedience under the Civil Rights Act. Id. at 548-49.
25. The distinction between excess and clear absence of jurisdiction depends upon the
definition of jurisdiction. "Jurisdiction, for... [immunity] purpose[s], has been defined as
the authority to act officially in the matter then in hand ... or as the power to hear and
determine a cause." McGlasker v. Calton, 397 F. Supp. 525, 530 (M.D. Ala. 1975). In Bradley
v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1871) and Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. 523 '(1868), the defendant
judges were exercising their authority to admit, disbar, or discipline the members of the bar
practicing in their courts. The Supreme Court held that the judges dearly had authority to
act even though the course of action they chose was in excess of their jurisdiction. See generally McGlasker v. Calton, 397 F. Supp. 525 (M.D. Ala. 1975) (judge sentencing plaintiff to
a term longer than provided by statute for contempt of court acted in excess of jurisdiction);
MacKay v. Nesbett, 285 F. Supp. 498 (D. Alas. 1968) (in suit brought against the Supreme
Court of Alaska, discipline of bar members found within that court's jurisdiction so that
the Alaska court had authority to suspend plaintiff for one year). But cf. Ryan v. Scoggin,
245 F.2d 54 (10th Cir. 1957) (liberalizing the rule to the extent that it is "absence of any
color" of jurisdiction which pierces immunity).
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cess of jurisdiction and those done in "clear absence of all jurisdiction,"28
limited immunity to acts done in excess of jurisdiction. Additionally, immunity from liability applied only to judicial acts.

27

In cases dealing with sterilization, the weight of authority was that judges
had no jurisdiction to order or approve sterilization absent a specific statutory
grant of authority.2s Accordingly, a district court held in Wade v. Bethesda
Hospital29 that a judge acted in clear absence of jurisdiction by ordering plaintiff's sterilization. In the context of sterilization, which deprived the plaintiff
of the fundamental right to procreate,3 0 authority for the judge's action could
not be inferred from a grant of general jurisdiction.31 Therefore, his act done

26. 80 U.S. at 351. The Court stated: "A distinction must be here observed between excess of jurisdiction and the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject matter. Where
there is no jurisdiction over the subject-matter any authority exercised is a usurped authority,
and for the exercise of such authority, when the want of jurisdiction is known to the judge,
no excuse is permissible. But where jurisdiction over the subject-matter is invested by law in
the judge, or in the court which he holds, the manner and extent in which the jurisdiction
shall be exercised are generally as much questions for his determination as any other questions involved in the case, although upon the correctness of his determination in these
particulars the validity of his judgments may depend." Id.
27. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 338 (1871). "Whether the act done by . . . [a judge]
was judicial or not . . . '[was] to be determined by its character, and not by the character of
[the] agent." Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 348.
28. In the most recent decision concerning the authority of courts to approve or order
the sterilization of a child, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that jurisdiction to exercise
the awesome power of denying to a human being the fundamental right to bear or beget a
child may be conferred only by specific statutory authority. Ex rel. M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467,
471 (Mo. 1974). See Frazier v. Levi, 440 S.W.2d 393 (Eex. Ct. App. 1969); Holmes v. Powers,
439 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1968).
29. 337 F. Supp. 671 (1971), aff'd on rehearing, 356 F. Supp. 380 (S.D. Ohio 1973). The
facts in Wade are similar to those in the instant case. In Wade, the county child welfare
board petitioned in Ohio probate court to order the sterilization of a "feeble minded" person.
Id. at 673. Defendant Judge Gary ordered plaintiff's sterilization. Id. Defendant Gary relied
on a general statutory grant of jurisdiction similar to that granted Judge Stump which
stated: "The probate court shall have plenary power at law and in equity fully to dispose of
any matter properly before the court, unless the power is expressly otherwise limited or
denied by statute." Id. When plaintiff sough damages under §1983, the district court held
that Judge Gary had no immunity and was liable for his action in ordering the sterilization.
Id. at 674. The court stated that in the absence of a specific statutory grant of sterilization
power, Judge Gary did not have jurisdiction; thus, the grant of general jurisdiction did not
authorize Judge Gary's action. Id. The court held that because defendant Gary acted wholly
without jurisdiction, he was not protected by the doctrine of judicial immunity. Id.
30. In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), the Court held that a state statute
which provided for the sterilization of habitual criminals was unconstitutional. In so doing
the Court held that the right to procreate was a fundamental right: "Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." Id. at 541. The Court
warned that the power to sterilize, if exercised, could have subtle, far-reaching and devasting
effects. Id. Furthermore, the Court noted that an individual who was sterilized by operation
of law would have been deprived forever of a basic liberty. Id. For a history of eugenics and
sterilization statutes in the United States and the rise and fall of the eugenics movement, see
generally Burgdorf, The Wicked Witch is Almost Dead: Buck v. Bell and the Sterilization of
Handicapped Persons, 50 TEMp. L. Q. 995, 1006-08 (1977).
31. 337 F. Supp. at 673-74.
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in the absence rather than in mere excess of jurisdiction deprived him of immunity.
Assuming that a judge had jurisdiction, he could still be liable for his challenged act if it were non-judicial. Although the Supreme Court has not defined

a judicial act for immunity purposes, the lower courts have maintained that
not every act by a judge is a judicial act.32 In Gregory v. Thompson, 3 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that a court must look beyond the status
of a party seeking immunity to consider. the nature of the conduct for which
,immunity was sought. 34 Further justifying its grant of immunity, the court

stated that a judicial act, within the meaning of the doctrine, may normally be

corrected on appeal.3 5 Therefore, according to the court, judges were subject to
liability for acts which could not properly be characterized as judicial.

In the instant case, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that a
judicial officer should be free to act upon his own convictions without apprehension of personal liability.36 The Court noted, however, that the doctrine of
immuity protected a judge from civil liability only when he was performing
a judicial act within his jurisdiction. To determine whether Judge Stump was
immune to suit, the Court examined the judge's order in light of his authority
to act.3 7

As an Indiana circuit court judge, Judge Stump was vested by statute with
general jurisdiction over all cases and other causes where exclusive jurisdiction
was not conferred by law upon some other court.38 The Court construed this
provision as a broad jurisdictional grant which could include the authority to
approve a petition for tubal ligation.39 Absent a specific statute or common law
doctrine denying a court of general jurisdiction the authority to entertain a
32. "However, not every action by a judge is in exercise of his judicial function. For
example, it is not a judicial function for a judge to commit an intentional tort even though
the tort occurs in the courthouse." Yates v. Hoffman, 209 F. Supp. 757, 759 (N.M. I11. 1962)
(because it was not a judicial function for a magistrate to direct a police officer to arrest and
take into custody a person not named in a warrant, the magistrate was not immune from
suit). See Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1970) (judge acting as presiding officer of
a legislative and administrative body had not performed a judicial act when he ordered that
a member of that body be forcibly removed from the meeting and jailed). Also, see note 27
supra.
3. 500 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1974).
34. In Gregory, the defendant judge physically assaulted a non-lawyer who had refused
to leave wtien the judge ordered him to leave the courtroom. The court stated: "The decision
to personally evict someone from a courtroom by the use of physical force . . . [was] simply
not an act of a judicial nature...
Id. at 64. Therefore, the court concluded that the defendant was not entitled to automatic immunity. Id.
35. Id. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 US. 547, 554 (1967).
36. 98 S. Ct. 1099, 1104 (1978).
37. Id. at 1105.
38. Id. IND. CODE §33-4-4-3 (1971) (amended 1975) provided in part: "Jurisdiction -Said
court shall have original exclusive jurisdiction in all cases at law and in equity whatsoever .... It shall also have exclusive jurisdiction of the settlement of decedents' estates and
of guardianships .... [I]t shall have such appellate jurisdiction as may be conferred by law,
and it shall have jurisdiction of all other causes, matters and proceedings where exclusive
jurisdiction thereof is not conferred by law upon some other court, board or officer."
: .39. 98S. Ct. at 1105.
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petition like that presented to Judge Stump, the Court found that the judge
had jurisdiction over the subject matter.4 0 Thus, because neither statute41 nor
common law4 2 prohibited a circuit judge from authorizing a minor's sterilization, the Court held that Judge Stump had acted within his jurisdiction. 43
Although the Court found that Judge Stump had acted within his jurisdiction, it recognized that he would not be entitled to judicial immunity if approval of the petition were not a judicial act.4 4 In considering for the first time
for immunity purposes the necessary attributes of a judicial act, the Court discussed several controlling factors. The Court noted that the informality's with
which Judge Stump proceeded could not render his act non-judicial" 6 Rather,
the critical determinative factors were the nature of the act4 7 and the expectations of the parties.48 In the instant case the Court concluded that Judge
Stump performed a judicial act when he signed the sterilization petition, because signing petitions was a normal judicial function 49 and because appellant's mother believed that he was acting in his official capacity. 0
The Court emphasized the purpose and necessity of judicial immunity in
protecting judges from vexatious litigation.5' Thus, despite the tragic consequences of his act and the fact that approval of the petition may have been in

40. Mr. Justice White wrote for the majority: "But in our view, it is more significant that
there was no Indiana statute and no case law in 1971 prohibiting a circuit court, a court of
general jurisdiction, from considering a petition of the type presented to Judge Stump." Id.
41. The Court held that the Indiana statutes (IND. CoDE §§16-13-13-1 through 16-13-13-4
(1971) (amended 1973) providing for the sterilization of certain institutionalized persons did
not warrant the inference that all other judicial authority to approve sterilization was prohibited. The Court found no statute specifically prohibiting courts of general jurisdiction
from approving petitions for tubal ligation. Id.
42. But cf. cases cited in note 28 supra and in note 62 infra.
43. 98 S. Ct. at 1106.
44. "It is only for acts performed in his 'judicial' capacity that a judge is absolutely im.
mune." Id.
45. See note 3 supra.
46. The Court cited two earlier decisions for the proposition that failure to comply with
procedural requirements (such as entry of a petition on the docket or the ordering of a contempt citation outside of the courtroom) could not render a judge's action non-judicial. 98
S. Ct. at 1107, citing In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945); McAlester v. Brown, 469 F.2d 1280
(5th Cir. 1972).
47. Whether an act was judicial was determined by: "whether it . . . [was] a function
normally performed by a judge." 98 S.Ct. at 1107.
48. The Court stated the test of the second factor as: "whether . .. [the parties] dealt
with the judge in his official capacity." Id.
49. "State judges with general jurisdiction not infrequently are called upon in their
official capacity to approve petitions relating to the affairs of minors, as for example, a petition to settle a minor's claim." Id. at 1108.
50. "We may infer from the record that it was only because Judge Stump served in that
position that .. . [appellant's mother], on advice of counsel, submitted the petition to him
for his approval." Id.
51. Id. "Despite the unfairness to litigants that sometimes results, the doctrine of judicial
immunity is thought to be in the best interests of the proper administration of justice ...
[for it allows] a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him to be free to act
upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself." Id.
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error, Judge Stump was held immune from liability for damages because his
52
act was judicial and within his jurisdiction.
Justice Stewart, in a dissenting opinion in which Justice Marshall and
Justice Powell joined, stated that "what Judge Stump did... was beyond the
pale of anything that could sensibly be called a judicial act." 53 Justice Stewart
rejected the majority's enunciated determinants of judicial action, deeming
that such a test would render meaningless the inherent limitations on immunity.4 He stated that the test of whether an act is judicial should instead be
based on the factors supporting immunity from liability,55 including the
judge's duty to decide all cases within his jurisdiction, the possibility of an
appeal to correct his errors, and protection of the judge from suit by unsatisfied litigants.56 Finding in the instant situation no case, no possibility of
appeal,57 and no litigants, Justice Stewart concluded that Judge Stump's approval of the petition was not a judicial act.58
In analyzing the authority vested in a court of general jurisdiction, the
Court did not consider the weight of lower court decisional law. With only
one exception,5 9 the earlier lower court decisions had held that a specific statute
was needed to confer jurisdiction over sterilization matters.60 The Supreme

Court looked only at Indiana common law and concuded that there was no
specific limitation upon a court of general jurisdiction precluding Judge
Stump's consideration of a sterilization petition.61 In light of the common law

of other states, 62 the Court could have inferred that a judge vested with general jurisdiction could not approve a person's sterilization without a specific
52. Id. at 1108-09.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall and Powell, J.J.).
Id.
Id. at 1111.
Id., citing Pierson v. Ray, 383 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).
Mr. Justice Powell wrote a separate dissent emphasizing that the central feature of

the case was that appellant was precluded from vindicating her rights elsewhere in the
judicial system. 98 S. Ct. at 1111 (Powell, J., dissenting).
58. Id.
59. The court in In re Simpson, 180 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio Prob. 1962) held that an Ohio
probate judge had the authority to order the sterilization of a young woman. However, the
district court in Wade v. Bethesda Hosp., 357 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1971) held that the
same judge had acted without jurisdiction and could be held civilly liable for the damages
that resulted from his sterilization order. That he had previously ordered a person sterilized
without liability was not controlling. Id. at 674.
60. See note 28 supra and accompanying text. See also Burgdorf, supra note 30, at 1023:
"The overwhelming trend in judicial precedent has been to preclude parents, guardians, and
courts from giving consent for the sterilization of mentally incompetent adults and from
compelling the sterilization of minors in the absence of a state sterilization law."
61. 98 S.Ct. at 1105-06.
62. In A.L. v. G.R.H., 325 N.E.2d 501 (Ind.App. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976),
the Indiana court of appeals held that a parent did not have the common law right to consent to the sterilization of his minor child. While the intervening decision in that case was
not controlling in the instant case, it should be noted that the Indiana court cited as controlling precedent the very cases which the Supreme Court did not recognize as part of the
common law of that state. For the cases cited by the Indiana court, see note 28 supra. See also
Kemp v. Kemp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 758, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1974).
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statutory grant of authority.63 The majority of the Court, however, disregarded
the weight of the common law proscription of authority,64 and refused to require such a specific grant of power.
In examining the statutory law of Indiana, the Court found that the statute
providing that parents of a minor have the authority to consent to the medical
or surgical care of their child69 supported jurisdiction over the sterilization
petition. Yet that statute implied that a parent could consent only to necessary
medical treatment of his child.66 Because the sterilization of appellant was not
68
necessary,67 it should not have come within the ambit of the Indiana statute.
Thus, no statutory law supported the Court's conclusion that a court of general
jurisdiction had authority over the sterilization petition.
The Court then analyzed the factors determining whether a judge's act is a
judicial one for immunity purposes. Focusing first on the nature of the act of
signing the petition, the Court failed to consider the petition's substance and
effect. 69 Stating that judges with general jurisdiction have the authority to approve petitions relating to the affairs of minors, the Court implied that a
petition which would deprive a minor of a fundamental right 0 was no different from a petition to settle a minor's claim. That the two types of petitions
should not be equated is apparent. Deprivation of fundamental human rights
is not a "function normally performed by judges" 71 even though accomplished through the mechanics of signing a petition. The Court's second
determinant of the judicial nature of a judge's act was whether the parties believed that they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity. But, as the dissenters pointed out: "False illusions as to a judge's power can hardly convert a
judge's response to those illusions into a judicial act." 72 Only rarely would
parties seeking judicial action expect a judge not to be acting in his official

63. See Wade v. Bethesda Hosp., 337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1971). See generally
Burgdorf, supra note 30, at 1022-23.
64. The Court stated: "that neither by statute [nor] case law [had] the broad jurisdiction
granted to the circuit courts of Indiana been circumscribed to foreclose consideration of a
petition for authorization of a minor's sterilization." 98 S. Ct. at 1105-06.
65. IND. CODE §16-8-4-2 (1971) (amended 1973).
66. In A.L. v. G.R.H., 325 N.E.2d, 501, 502 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975), the Indiana court of
appeals held that sterilization did not involve any life saving necessities. Because it was not a
necessary medical treatment, the court held that the parents of a minor did not have the
authority to consent on behalf of the minor to her sterilization. Id.
67. The only reason for the sterilization given by appellant's mother was to avoid unfortunate circumstances. See nole 2 supra. No medical reason for sterilization was given nor
was any reason given for not employing a less drastic means of birth control.
68. See A.L. v. G.R.H., 325 N.E.2d, 501, 502 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975).
69. The significance of the substance of the petition was made clear when the question
was posed: "Can a judge cut off arms and legs merely because the power to do so [was] not
specifically denied him by the statute granting his jurisdiction?" Brief for Respondents at 6,
Stump v. Sparkman, 98 S. Ct. 1099 (1978).
70. See note 30 supra.
71. 98 S. Ct. at 1107.
72. Id. at 1110. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 348 (1879) (whether an act done by
a judge was judicial is to be determined by the character of the act, not by the office held by
the actor).
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capacity. Clearly, the factors established by the Court for determining the
judicial nature of an act are not viable.
The Court's analysis of the purpose of judicial immunity focused solely on
the need to protect judges from vexatious or malicious law suits, without considering the extent to which an individual's rightswere circumscribed or
whether an appeal was effectively foreclosed. If the Court had instead balanced
individual constitutional rights against the inimical effects of judicial liability,73 the result need not have been in favor of judicial immunity. Extension
of liability to outrageous judicial behavior would not open the floodgates to
vexatious litigation and would not unduly interfere with judicial independence. Only judges who act with disregard for the constitutional rights of
individuals would have to fear civil liability. 4
The instant decision creates an unqualified judicial immunity. The Court's
broad test for determining the judicial nature of an act rendered meaningless
that qualification to the general rule of immunity. As a result, judges are
isolated by an unqualified protection from accountability for their injudicious
actions.75 Vindication of the deprivation of individual rights has been subordinated to the Court's interest in insulating judges from civil liability. Consequently, the independence of the judiciary has been strengthened at the
expense of the rights of individuals.
MERRY

E. LINDBERG

73. See Kattan, supra note 13, at 957: "The constitutional rights of individuals necessarily
are balanced, as with all section 1983 immunities, against the deterrent effect of damage
liability upon the effective performance of official functions." See generally Note, supra note
13, at 833-38.
74. One author described the Court of Appeals decision in Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552
F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1977) as the paradigm of judicial liability. Kattan, supra note 13, at 960-63.
Furthermore, the dissenters concluded that if intimidation would serve to deter the recurrence of such action by a judge, "that would be in the public interest." 98 S. Ct. at 1111. See
generally Amicus Curiae Brief of the Nat'l Center for Law and the Handicapped at 42,
Stump v. Sparkman, 98 S. Ct. 1099 (1978).
75. See generally Note, supra note 13, at 827-38. For an example of a legislator's liability
for violating an individual's constitutional rights, see Davis v. Passman, 544 F.2d 865 (5th
Cir. 1977) (a congressman was not entitled to immunity in a suit by a former member of his
staff alleging sex discrimination).
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